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Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama and the Future of
Juvenile Sentencing
John F. Stinneford*
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that statutes authorizing
mandatory sentences of life in prison with no possibility of parole [LWOP] are
unconstitutional as applied to offenders who were under eighteen when they
committed their crimes.' Miller is the latest in a series of cases restricting the
punishments that may be inflicted for crimes committed by minors. In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court held that it was cruel and unusual to execute anyone for a
crime committed under the age of eighteen.2 In Graham v. Florida, the Court held
that it was unconstitutional to impose an LWOP sentence on anyone who
committed a nonhomicide offense under that age.3 Finally, Miller created a
presumption against LWOP sentences even for those minors who commit
homicide. The Court held that such offenders have a right to an individualized
sentencing determination before being given an LWOP sentence, and that
"appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty
will be uncommon." 4
Miller arose from two cases involving defendants who received mandatory
life sentences for homicides committed when they were fourteen-years-old. In the
first case, Kuntrell Jackson participated in the robbery of a video store, during
which one of Jackson's associates shot and killed the store clerk.6 Jackson was
charged as an adult and convicted of capital felony murder and aggravated
robbery.' In the second case, Evan Miller and a friend beat a man in the head with
a baseball bat after stealing his wallet.8 At one point, Miller proclaimed "I am
God, I've come to take your life," just before striking the victim on the head.9
Miller and his friend later set fire to the victim's trailer in an attempt to cover up
the crime.'o The victim died of a combination of head injuries and smoke
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law, Gainesville,
Florida.
' 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
2 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
3 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
4 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
' Id at 2460.
6 Id. at 2461.
7 Ida
' Idat 2462.
9Id
10 Id
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inhalation." Prior to the crime, Miller had been in and out of foster care because
of his parents' substance addictions and abusive behavior.1 2  Miller himself
regularly used illegal drugs and alcohol and had attempted suicide on four prior
occasions. 3 Miller was charged as an adult and convicted of murder in the course
of an arson.14 Both convictions gave rise to a mandatory LWOP sentence.'
Several of the themes presented in Miller may have future significance both
inside and outside the Eighth Amendment context. The most obviously important
of these themes is youth. The Miller Court based its holding on the assertion that
"children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing." '6
The Court held that minors are generally less morally responsible, more impulsive,
less deterrable, and possess a greater capacity for rehabilitation than adults.' Bad
behavior in minors is not necessarily evidence of a depraved character because
their character is not yet "well formed" or "fixed."'1 Minors are also generally
more susceptible to negative outside pressures than adults,'9 and less capable of
20protecting their own interests in dealing with the criminal justice system. In
making this final point, the Court cited JD.B. v. North Carolina, a Fifth
Amendment case in which the Court held that the age of a suspect is relevant to the
question of whether she is in custody for Miranda purposes.21 Taken together,
J.D.B. and the Roper/Graham/Miller line of cases indicate that the Supreme Court
may be developing a constitutional distinction between minors and adults that
applies across a range of contexts. Children may be "constitutionally different" 22
from adults for many purposes beyond criminal sentencing.
A second significant theme is science. In Miller (as well as Roper and
Graham) the Supreme Court relied on behavioral studies that tended to confirm the
"common sense" belief that minors are generally less responsible, more impulsive,
and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.23 It also relied on neuroscientific
studies showing that "parts of the brain involved in behavior control" are not yet
11 Ida
12 Id.
'4 id.
2o Id. at 2464
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2468
21 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) ("[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.")
22 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
23 id
2 [Vol 11: 1
YOUTH MA TTERS
fully developed during adolescence.24 The Supreme Court's willingness to give
scientific findings constitutional significance could impact any number of
constitutional doctrines, both inside and outside the Eighth Amendment context.
The use of science to inform doctrine holds out the promise of allowing the Court
to update constitutional law in accordance with our best understanding of the
human person and of the world in which we live. But as a basis for constitutional
doctrine, science may undermine tomorrow what it builds up today. The Supreme
Court's use of scientific studies in Roper, Graham, and Miller has been criticized
on the ground that at least some of the studies are unsound 25 and that the Court has
drawn inferences about moral responsibility and deterrability that go well beyond
what the studies show.26 To the extent such studies are merely used to confirm
longstanding "common sense" judgments about the nature of adolescents (for
example), such criticisms may not pose a serious problem for the Court. But the
more the Court tries to use science to move constitutional doctrine beyond settled
societal understandings about the human person and the world in which we live,
the more vulnerable such doctrine will be to these sorts of critique.
A third important theme of Miller is mandatory sentences. Whereas Roper
and Graham imposed a categorical ban on certain types of punishment in certain
circumstances, Miller simply required that juvenile homicide offenders be given an
individualized sentencing determination before being given an LWOP sentence.
This decision may mark the beginning of a broader change in the Supreme Court's
attitude toward mandatory sentencing schemes. Several decades ago, as part of its
"death is different" jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that mandatory
sentencing schemes are impermissible in the death penalty context,27 but pose no
constitutional problem in relation to sentences of imprisonment-even LWOP
sentences.28 The Miller Court's decision to break down the barrier between capital
and non-capital cases (at least in the LWOP context) may herald either a
willingness to reexamine the constitutionality of harsh mandatory sentencing
24 Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)).
25 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings ofRoper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 379 (2006) (criticizing the Supreme Court for relying on scientific sources that
were "insufficient and outdated").
26 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome, 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 409
(2006) ("The neuroscience evidence [discussed in Roper] in no way independently confirms that
adolescents are less responsible. If the behavioral differences between adolescents and adults were
slight, it would not matter if their brains are quite different. Similarly, if the behavioral differences
were sufficient for moral and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not matter if the
brains were essentially indistinguishable."); William J. Katt, Roper and the Scientific Amicus, 49
JURIMETRICS J. 253, 268 (2009) ("Although common sense might tell us that adolescents clearly
behave differently than adults, the sources cited by the Science Brief do not seem to prove that
point.").
27 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
28 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) ("[A] sentence which is not otherwise
cruel and unusual" does not "becom[e] so simply because it is mandatory.").
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schemes generally or to impose on the LWOP sentencing process the entire
machinery of constitutional procedure currently required in capital cases. Either
change could have profound significance for non-capital sentencing.
A fourth potentially important theme of Miller is juvenile transfer statutes.
One could plausibly claim that the entire Roper/Graham/Miller line of cases is the
result of the movement in the 1990s-in reaction to the "juvenile superpredator"
panic-to amend the statutes allowing juvenile offenders to be transferred to adult
court for trial. In a single five-year period, some forty-five states amended their
transfer statutes to make it easier to move juveniles into adult court, thus making
them potentially subject to execution or LWOP sentences. 29 Roper, Graham, and
Miller may be a judicial reaction to the resulting increase in underage offenders
being given very harsh criminal sentences in adult criminal court. The Supreme
Court has not yet entertained a direct constitutional challenge to these new transfer
statutes, but their harsh effects could be an underlying motivation for the Court's
decision to limit the punishments that may be imposed on underage offenders.
A fifth theme of Miller is the conflict between "evolving standards of
decency" and the Supreme Court's "independent judgment." Since the late 1950s,
the Supreme Court has taken the position that it is not bound by the original
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, but is free to interpret the
Clause in accordance with current moral standards. 30 From the beginning, there
has been ambiguity and conflict concerning the source of such "current" standards.
Should the Court focus on "societal consensus," or should it rely on its own
"independent judgment" (perhaps informed by the Court's own reading of
scientific and philosophical literature)? 1  For decades, the Supreme Court has
pretended that current "societal consensus" and its own "independent judgment"
are in perfect accord with each other, but such pretense has become increasingly
implausible.32 In Miller, the Supreme Court signals a willingness to move away
from consulting "societal consensus" and toward sole reliance on its own
independent judgment. The Miller Court makes no effort to show that there is a
29 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT
88-89 (1999).
30 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause should be interpreted in light of "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society").
31 Compare, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (using both "evolving
standards of decency" and the Court's own judgment to determine whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (using "evolving standards of
decency" but explicitly refusing to use the Court's own judgment as part of the test for
unconstitutionality), and Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (using both "evolving
standards of decency" and the Court's own independent judgment).
32 See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 922-23 (2011) (arguing that recent cases "show that the
evolving standards of decency test is often deeply at odds with the Supreme Court's own judgment"
and that the Supreme Court increasingly resolves this problem by creating a "fictionalized [societal]
consensus against the punishment to support its own judgment").
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current societal consensus against mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders. Instead, it argues that its holding is justified because it flows
logically and "straightforwardly" 33 from the Court's own prior Eighth Amendment
precedents,34 and because it accords with the Court's own beliefs concerning the
proper justifications for punishment.35  This movement away from "evolving
standards of decency" and toward the exercise of judgment unconstrained by
binding constitutional standards leaves the future development of Eighth
Amendment doctrine radically uncertain.
The articles in this Symposium shed important light on the significance of
Miller for the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and for juvenile
justice more generally.
The first two articles concern the effect Miller may have on the "death is
different" approach that has dominated the Supreme Court's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments jurisprudence over the past thirty years. Until recently, the Supreme
Court followed a two-track approach to claimed Eighth Amendment violations:
giving robust proportionality review to claims involving the death penalty and
virtually no review to claims relating to terms of incarceration. Starting with
Graham v. Florida, the Court has moved away from the death/imprisonment
distinction, and focused instead on whether a case raises a categorical challenge to
a given punishment.37  Categorical challenges now appear to get the searching
proportionality review that was previously reserved for death penalty cases, 38 but
the Court has done little to specify what sorts of case are appropriate for a
categorical challenge, and what sorts are not.
Richard Frase 39 sees Miller and other recent applications of categorical
analysis as a potential expansion of the "death is different" approach, not a
repudiation of it. Frase identifies a number of factors present in these cases that
might make a future Eighth Amendment challenge sufficiently "different" from a
1 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
34 The Miller Court does attempt to answer the argument that there is a societal consensus in
favor of mandatory LWOP sentences, as demonstrated by the fact that such sentences are authorized
by the federal government and twenty eight states. See id. The Court makes no effort, however, to
demonstrate a societal consensus against such punishments.
35 Id at 2464-66.
36 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MIcH. L. REv. 1145, 1145 (2009)
("The Supreme Court takes two very different approaches to substantive sentencing law. Whereas its
review of capital sentences is robust, its oversight of noncapital sentences is virtually nonexistent.").
37 See Graham v. Florida 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021-22 (2010) (distinguishing the Supreme
Court's two lines of Eighth Amendment proportionality cases on the ground that some focused on
"all of the circumstances of the case" while others "used categorical rules to define Eighth
Amendment standards").
38 See id. (declaring that it is cruel and unusual to impose LWOP sentences on the entire
category of juvenile nonhomicide offenders).
3 Richard S. Frase, What's "Diferent" (Enough) in Eighth Amendment Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 9 (2013).
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typical term-of-imprisonment challenge to warrant categorical treatment, even for
an adult offender. These factors include: 1) whether the offender has
constitutionally relevant personal characteristics, such as juvenile status or mental
retardation; 2) whether the offender has been given a death sentence or an LWOP
sentence, which the Supreme Court considers comparable to death; 3) whether the
offender has been given a mandatory sentence; 4) whether the offender has been
convicted of a nonhomicide offense; and 5) whether the offender is a low-
culpability accomplice. Frase argues that the focus on these factors in Miller and
Graham may signal a burgeoning preference for categorical Eighth Amendment
challenges that extends well beyond the old "death is different" approach. Frase
analyzes how categorical challenges might work post-Miller, and shows how the
"different" factors he identifies might even lead to more robust constitutional
review in non-categorical "as applied" challenges to terms of imprisonment.
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker4 0 explore the implications of the Miller
Court's decision to "breach[] the capital versus non-capital divide" 4' by requiring
individualized sentencing in juvenile LWOP cases as well as death penalty cases.
They ask, for example, whether the Court will ultimately require states to use the
same elaborate and expensive sentencing procedures in LWOP hearings that
currently obtain in the death penalty context. If so, they argue, this may force
states to abandon or severely limit juvenile LWOP. If the Court were to expand
the individualized sentencing requirement to cover adult as well as juvenile
LWOPs, however, this move might have the perverse effect of increasing the
number of death penalty cases. Prosecutors faced with the choice between a costly
death penalty proceeding and a costly LWOP proceeding may well choose the
former over the latter. Ultimately, Steiker & Steiker are skeptical as to whether the
Supreme Court will move much further toward breaching the capital/non-capital
divide, at least with respect to the procedural requirements for sentencing. They
are also skeptical as to whether the importation of such procedures into the non-
capital context would provide much real protection to defendants. Steiker &
Steiker do express modest optimism, however, that the Supreme Court's focus on
the inappropriateness of imposing very harsh sentences on juvenile offenders may
create an impetus for political reform.
The next three articles focus on the relationship between Miller and juvenile
justice policy.
Franklin Zimring and Stephen Rushin42 present an empirical study of the
relationship between juvenile homicide rates and the punitive changes made to the
juvenile justice system in response to the superpredator panic of the 1990s.
Juveniles crime rates rose dramatically from the mid-1980s through the early-
40 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Diferent?, 11
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37 (2013).
41 Id. at 38.
42 Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen Rushin, Did Changes in Juvenile Sanctions Reduce
Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural Experiment, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57 (2013).
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1990s, then declined dramatically from the mid-1990s through 2010. Some have
argued that this decline was caused by widespread statutory changes in the 1990s
that made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders into adult court and subject them
to harsher punishment. Zimring & Rushin's study calls this hypothesis into
question by showing that the rate of homicides committed by young adults
declined during this period to almost precisely the same degree as the juvenile
homicide rate. Since young adults were not directly affected by changes to the
juvenile transfer statutes, Zimring & Rushin's study implies that some other cause
affecting both juveniles and young adults must have pushed down the homicide
rates for both groups. If this is so, the harsher transfer statutes would appear to
have had virtually no effect on juvenile homicide rates, and would thus appear to
be seriously misguided.
Elizabeth Scott43 argues that Miller is important, despite its seemingly modest
holding, because it clarifies the unique status of juveniles under Eighth
Amendment doctrine. Miller also demonstrates that the Supreme Court has
embraced the wisdom of a developmental model of youth crime regulation and
given it constitutional status. Scott identifies four lessons that policymakers
should take from this decision. First, because juveniles are generally less culpable
than adults, they should generally be subject to more lenient criminal sanctions.
Second, the transfer of juveniles to adult court should be rare, and should be based
on the individualized decision of a judge. Third, juvenile sanctions should focus
on rehabilitation and reform, not punishment. Fourth, juvenile crime regulation
can usefully be guided by developmental science.
Barry Feld" argues that the reasoning of Miller supports a specific juvenile
justice sentencing policy: a youth discount. Although the Roper/Graham/Miller
line of cases recognizes the categorically diminished responsibility of youthful
offenders, it provides them limited relief. The death penalty has been forbidden
for juvenile offenders, and the use of LWOP sentences has been greatly limited.
But beyond these bounds, there are no restrictions on the length of incarceration
juvenile offenders may be given. For example, under Roper/Graham/Miller, life
sentences are still permissible so long as the juvenile offender gets some
"meaningful opportunity" to argue for parole at some point during his
incarceration. Feld argues that sentencing laws would better reflect the diminished
responsibility of youthful offenders if they were changed to provide a "youth
discount"-that is, "a proportional reduction of adult sentence lengths based on the
youth of the offender." 45 Such a reduction would, Feld argues, formally recognize
the mitigating quality of youthfulness, take into account the fact that juvenile
offenders have a much greater chance to mature and develop into law abiding
43 Elizabeth S. Scott, "Children are Different:" Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71 (2013).
4 Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the
Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 107 (2013).
45 Id. at 108.
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citizens, and give them a chance at a future life despite the serious mistakes
represented by their criminal conduct.
Finally, Jeremiah Bourgeois46 provides the perspective of a man who was
given a mandatory LWOP sentence some twenty years ago for a crime committed
when he was fourteen. Bourgeois argues that the criminal justice system provides
a mere pretense of rehabilitation to criminal offenders. He argues that the system
is based on a distorted view of retribution that fails to recognize the distinction
between wrongdoing committed by children and wrongdoing committed by adults.
Bourgeois's article demonstrates, by its very existence, that even the most troubled
adolescents who commit the most serious crimes have the capacity to grow in
knowledge, maturity, and perspective on the world around them-a capacity that is
implicitly denied by the imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences on juvenile
offenders.
46 Jeremiah Bourgeois, The Irrelevance of Reform: Maturation in the Department of
Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149 (2013).
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